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ABSTRACT 
After examining some components of a framework articulated in terms 
of general remarks on logic (in which two inadequate views of it are 
critically investigated), we present some arguments to the effect that a 
fallibilist, pluralist, though certaínly not relativist, proposal might be 
interestingly pursued. Based on this proposal, we argüe for a 
comprehensive agnosticism in connection to some issues raised by 
paraconsistency (in particular with regard to the existence of true 
contradictions). Such an agnosticism, not being phiiosophically 
committed to any particular "interpretative" claims surroundíng 
paraconsistency, seems to be at the moment more adequate than the 
alternative proposals. 
(Introduction; I. Logic: old-fashioned and radical views; 2. A true logic?; 
3. True contradictions?; 4. Concluding remarks) 
Indeed, even at this stage, I predict a lime when there will be 
mathematical investigations of calculi containing conlradicíions, and 




The aim of this paper consists in putting forward some arguments in order 
to claim that one ofthe expressions in our title «does not denote». Indeed, the 
very idea of a unique, global, all-embracing logic («the whole logic», men-
tioned above) seems to be, for several reasons, fairly inadequate. We shall 
thus be talking in detall and for some time about a «non-existent» topic, and 
just as Popper has once remarked with regard to scientific method, there is 
frequently considerable things to be said on such issues. 
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In a less playful mode, we intend to present and to review here some 
arguments in favor of a pluralist stance with regard to logic in general and an 
agnostic view concerning some questíons in connection to paraconsistency in 
particular. Several theses to be here argued for seem to us quite straightfor-
ward (not to say simply obvious), being thus, at least for us, rather surprising 
to note how they can be so at odds with the literature, But anyway, this might 
be due to a general feature of philosophical issues (though perhaps not only of 
them): the obvious being so theory-laden and relative... , ,, -^^ 
In order to proceed towards our task, we shall fírst outline a comprehen-
sive framework within which the mentioned arguments will be later exam-
ined, This framework, to be suggested in sections 1 and 2, consists roughly of 
(rather) general points related to logic and some remarks concerning its na-
ture, Afterwards, in sections 2 and 3, the arguments are to be put forward, and 
their relative strength shall be evaluated, We conclude the piece gathering 
together some of its threads. 
Before closing this introduction, we wish to point out that the following 
discussion, in several respects, is quite preliminary and incomplete, being in 
need of further developments, which shall be opportunely pursued, 
; 1. LOGIC: OLD-FASHIONED AND RADICAL VIEWS "f 
As a certain «received view» of logic claims, for ages and indeed until 
recently (excepting mainly our century), logic has been thought of as a rather 
«uniform» discipline, as far as its basic conceptual setting is concerned, Its 
main problems, function, concepts and theoretical strategies, this view goes 
on, remained nearly «constant» throughout a considerable part of its develop-
ment, Of course, during the years there have been changes, in fact several of 
them, but they can be viewed mostly as adjustments within a well established 
framework, rather than revisions ofthe setting under consideration, From this 
point of view (except again for our century), logic seems not to be the most 
«revolutionary» field.' A natural problem that one shall face at present (given 
this interpretation of logic) consists then in supplying an explanation of such 
an obstínate feature. 
' For an interesting and illustrative discussion of this issue with regard to 
mathematics, see Gillies (ed,) [I992fl]. Of course, things are quite distinct if one 
considers the changes that logic has undergone from the last part of the nineteenth 
century onward; but we shall examine this in a moment. For a defense of a revolutionary 
view of this subject (considering specifically Frege's role), cf Gillies [19926]. 
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Despite its strangeness (in several respects), this partícularly monolithic 
view of logic and its development might still be extended to our own century, 
and then one would simply have one unique logic, the «whole» logic as viewed 
from a Fregean perspective, and which might include centuries ofthe Aristo-
telian approach as a special case. If this were not so, how to understand such a 
stability of logic, so strikingly distinct from other branches (even formal ones) 
of knowledge? 
One can think of old-fashioned explanations. 'Well', the nice fellow ap-
proaches us, 'logic has been so «stable» because it is from its very nature to be 
so. After all, it is concerned with the (most general) ways we use some «logi-
cal» words, such as, connectives, quantifiers, etc. (for a discussion, see Quine 
[1963]). And as far as this usage remains the same (or nearly the same), which 
means not changing our basic conceptual framework, it is natural to expect 
that our «logic» has not been modifíed as well.' 
There is indeed a serious sense in which this putative explanation is old-
fashioned, and this is concerned with the very conceptíon of logic adopted by 
its proponent in this context. Logic seems here to be taken basically as a tool 
employed in the evaluation of particular linguistic phenomena, for instance, 
and perhaps specially, in reasoning. To this extent, it is thought of as consist-
ing fundamentally of propositional and first-order quantificational logic, 
Though, of course, besides this, it might also be employed for the construction 
of mathematics. In order to do so, one needs set theory - but set theory, our 
fellow goes on, is not logic... 
It seems to us that there are several delicate issues entangled here. Just as 
other fíelds of knowledge, logic by no means could be described in such sim-
plistic terms. Similarly to mathematics, it can be viewed from a puré or from 
an applied perspective. From apure one, it is basically concerned with the 
formulation and study of certain abstract structures, such as, for instance, mod-
els, formal languages, Turing machines, etc. At this level, it is basically an a 
priori discipline, developed, like puré mathematics, with the same freedom 
that Cantor had once ídentified as the very nature of mathematics. That is, no 
unrevisable constraints are to be laid down beforehand here; indeed, as the 
development of paraconsistent logic has shown quite clearly, not even consis-
tency ones. In conformity to the celebrated Hilbertian motto to the effect that 
the mathematicians should examine all logically possible theories, the logi-
cians while devising and analyzing their structures shall proceed in a similar 
way. (Of course, the bounds of «logicality», and in particular, of what to deem 
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as «logically possible», with the inception of non-classical logics, have changed 
drastically within the present century.) ^_ 
Conversely, from an op/j/iWperspective, logic is fundamentally concerned 
with the use of abstract structures, which have been devised at the puré level, 
to model some aspects of particular domains of investigation, In fact, just as 
any particular fíeld of an empirical science, applied logics have also their proper 
domains. The delimitation of these domains depends of course, analogously to 
what happens within science proper, on several grounds, ranging from par-
ticular features of the abstract structures adopted to specific traits of the do-
main of application, as well as to the expected degree of precisión to be met by 
the problems being considered, At the applied level, however, as opposed to 
the puré one, empirical constraints (taken in a broad sense) have clearly a 
relevant function, in particular in the determinatíon ofthe acceptable solutions 
to the problems under examination, and to this extent logic is not quite so a 
priori but presents remarkable a posteriori traits. Moreover, pragmatic con-
siderations (such as theoretical simplicity, capacity of systematization etc.) 
enter as well. As a result ofthe interplay between pragmatic and empirical 
features (not to mention of course the obvious function of abstract structures), 
the heuristic resources at disposal ofthe applied logician are considerable. On 
this regard, we should note that the evaluation of particular samples of reason-
ing, usually taken as the very aim of logic, seems to us as nothing more than 
one of its applied roles, and by no means shall be mixed with its puré ones. 
(For further details on and developments of these views, see da Costa and 
Bueno [1996].) . -
With these remarks, we wish to point out the fact that, in our view, re-
stricting a consideration of logic just to (1) first-order logic and (2) to the sheer 
evaluation of arguments constítutes, beyond any doubts, an extreme oversim-
plification. Too much is left behind with such a move. In particular, the picture 
that emerges both of logic and its development seems to be, in several re-
spects, quite unsuitable. There is no room, for instance, to several important 
applications of logic both to mathematics and to the empirical sciences, ñor to 
an understanding of whole branches of theoretical research in puré logic, not 
to mention of course the emergence of non-classical systems. Moreover, the 
problem that this oversimplifíed proposal has been set out to solve (namely, 
the stability of logic) was left thoroughly unsettled, for this proposal has just 
shifted the analysis ofthe issue concerning the presumed stability of logic to 
the fairly more doubtful stability of our use of some «logical» words. To this 
extent, the «solution» (if there is any here) would be blatantly circular, given 
that the very meaning (and thus the proper stability) of such words depends 
upon the logic being employed! .., ; . 
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So much for old-fashioned explanations. These, however, by no means 
are the only ones at our disposal. One should also examine (and these are 
partícularly important in the present context) «radical» views, Logic, or so the 
latter goes, has been so stable because it is true! And if we have reached the 
truth with it, why should we ever change it? 
This is a perplexing and undeniably bold proposal, In fact, in what sense 
is a particular logic truel Of course, in order to answer such a question one has 
first to spell out the meaning of «logic» in this context, and then to ponder on 
the notion of truth that might be here employed, With regard to the former, the 
same considerations that we have just made (in connection to puré and applied 
logics) naturally hold, Indeed, logic can be viewed from several perspectives; 
think, just to take an example, about the connections between the so called 
linguistic and structural approaches to logic (for a discussion, in the context of 
algebraization issues, see Béziau [1996]), Of course, such a multifarious way 
of analyzing it, makes the whole issue surroundíng its characterization much 
more delicate, It is natural then that what to deem as logic by no means be an 
undisputed issue, being subject in particular to several methodological consid-
erations, From our perspective, given that logic is basically concemed with 
the study and systematization of certain conceptual structures, and that in or-
der to formúlate them we need, for instance, set theory, it seems reasonable to 
demand that a logic, to be taken as such, be developed at least up to this point, 
Anyway, trying not to take too many sides on this issue and considering 
logic in as abstract and general a way as possible within the present framework 
(be it concerned with the study of «logical» structures, with the application of 
them to particular mathematical or empirical issues or whatever), the problem 
- in fact the second one mentioned above - of considering (a particular) logic 
as true is undeniably subtle, Indeed, how to examine and to conceive the truth 
of such fíeld? Of course, one has here to distinguish, on the one hand, between 
mathematical and logical truths (as certain statements considered as true within 
particular domains of mathematics and logic) and, on the other hand, the thesis 
that mathematics and logic are true (which depends not only on their domains 
as puré disciplines, but presumably on those considered in their applications 
as well),^ In both cases, the conceptíon of truth to be adopted - truth as corre-
spondence, as coherence, a pragmatic view or a deflationary proposal - is by 
no means a trifling matter, and when our «radical» philosopher presents bis/ 
her case, one is supposed to have in mind which conception is being employed. 
^ There are several discussions of and proposals on both issues scattered 
through the literature (see, for instance, Benacerraf and Putnam (eds,) 
[1983], part III), 
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Depending on the chosen view, distinct philosophical conséquences (with re-
gard, for instance, to ontological commitments) are obtained, and have to be 
clearly sorted out, 
However, instead of pursuing here such a rather abstract and idealized 
line of inquiry, in what follows we intend to examine this issue in a special, 
«more concrete» fashion, trying afterwards to draw some conclusions for this 
general discussion. We shall thus briefly consider how the introduction of 
paraconsistency to the philosophical scene has brought new perspectives to 
some of theses issues, also presenting, along the way, critical remarks to some 
versions ofthe «radical» view. 
' • ^ * * ' - ' 2 . A T R U E L O G I C ? ' • ' " ' "^- ' '" - : * " > • -
When claiming that logic is true, the radical philosopher intends to high-
light an aspect of logic that may help to understand its stability. The fírst rather 
unclear point with this view, however, consists exactly in this assumption: is 
logic really stable in the intended sense? Indeed, specially in the present cen-
tury, with the comprehensive development of non-classical logics, dramatic 
changes have been brought into the logical scenario, and hardly anyone, at 
least in our view, would seriously claim that we don't have here a striking 
example of a revolution. Consider, in particular, the drastic revolution, some-
how already predicted by Wittgenstein (as his words in our motto indícate), 
represented by the inception of paraconsistent logic vis-á-vis the standard con-
ceptions ofthe role of consistency within our conceptual frameworks. So, one 
finally wonders, is there really stability in such a context? 
This is more than a rhetorical question. In fact, some recent writers, par-
tícularly from the non-classical «front», notwithstanding the emergence of al-
ternative logical proposals, surprisingly seem to defend the thesis that certain 
logics are true. As opposed perhaps to their fellows physicists, for centuries 
acquainted with the phenomenon of theory change, which might have eventu-
ally induced them to fallibilistic views, these writers seem to have simply 
changed the pole of their discussion. Ínstead of claiming, with the older «radi-
cal» proposals, that classical logic is a tool to apprehend the most general 
structure ofthe world (it is supposed to be true after all!), their new «radical» 
versión claims the same as far as certain non-classical logics are concemed, 
One wonders, in such a case, about the meaning of learning from experience -
that is, from the recent history of logic, Indeed, what is the import, the rel-
evance of this history, with the changes and moves that it has yielded, to our 
•fc 
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philosophical understanding of logic? Given these circumstances, how not to 
be fallibilistic after all? (And this defínitely is a rhetorical question!) 
Accepting such a fallibilism, nonetheless, by no means leads one neces-
sarily to a relativist view, In order to note this, the pure/applied «díchotomy» 
might be quite useful. As we have previously remarked, from our point of 
view, each particular logic has its specifíc domain of application (classical 
logic, for instance, as opposed to intuitionistic ones, is not appropriate to study 
the constructive features of mathematical thought), To this extent and in con-
trast to the «radical» views, an all-embracing logic, appropriate to all domains 
is hard to fínd, We are thus in general left with (several) alternative logics that 
describe only some aspects of them, and there are many heuristic and prag-
matic reasons to choose between such logics, depending in particular, of course, 
on the specifíc traits found in such domains. Thus the relativist threat, based 
on the claim that there are no criteria of cholee between rival logics, can be at 
least in part circumvented. A fallibilist view of logic (indeed, a rather natural 
outcome of the conspicuous proliferation of logical systems in the present 
century) does not seem then to imply relativism inescapabiy. 
It seems accordingly that the view that is here presented can naturally 
match some «lessons» of our recent history of logic, pointing out as they do to 
the proliferation of logical frameworks (which in turn spontaneously leads to 
fallibilism), with a refusal of a relativist stance, based on heuristic and prag-
matic grounds. As a matter of fact, the underlying motivation for the introduc-
tion of various non-classical logics^ consists exactly in specifíc inadequacies 
ofthe classical framework to deal with certain issues (which of course is notto 
claim, much on the contrary, that classical logic is worthlessl), From our stand-
point, this feature produces evidence in support of a «domain-oriented» view 
of logic, To some extent, or so we claim, each logic (at least with regard to its 
application level) has its proper domain, it «models» someaspectsof it, estab-
lishing what is and what is not acceptable within it, The natural move from 
^ For some motivations for the devising of paraconsistent logic, see da Costa 
and Bueno [1996], section 2; da Costa, Béziau and Bueno [1996], rntroduction; da 
Costa, Béziau and Bueno [1995], sections 2 and 5, and the rererences therein. We ¡ust 
wish to note here that among these motivations the interplay between semantic and set 
theoretic issues was of paramount importance. One should note that, at least on 
philosophical grounds, it is needed to have a paraconsistent set theory already articulated 
if one intends to develop a reasonable semantics for paraconsistent logic (given that 
semantics shall be constructed within set theory). That is the reason why the ilrst author, 
when first presented his paraconsistent systems, not having developed yet a 
paraconsistent set theory, formulated them in a syntactic, not in a semantic, way (for a 
discussion of some questíons related to semantics, see da Costa, Bueno and Béziau 
[1995]; for a recent treatment of some paraconsistent systems, cf da Costa, Béziau 
and Bueno [1995]). 
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here consists in advocating then a pluralist stance. However, for the same 
heuristic and pragmatic grounds, such a pluralism shall not commit us to a 
relativist view; after all one has some criteria of choice between rival logics, 
Of course, and we insist on this, such criteria, besides not being conclusive 
(we are all fallibilist), are not epistemic as well (for we are not planning to 
Ínflate our ontology), This is an important point, and with it we return to the 
issue of truth. ' •••"""! :»- <: ¡:-•-î ^ • ^ |̂  t¥* • ,,/'Í"' " • •'t. .> 
In not being interested in inflating our ontology, we intend to suggest that 
it is possible to present an account of some philosophical problems concerning 
logic independent from the notion of truth (or at least a strong notion of truth), 
and in particular, from the concept of a true logic, We wonder, in fact, in what 
respects these notions might be relevant to the compréhension of the main 
elements of logic, Our only guess concerns applied logics, If they are to be 
minimally successful, perhaps our «radical» might claim, they have to be true, 
at least as far as their domains are concerned, This is an interesting remark, 
The problem underlying it, as in general with any radical view, consists in 
supplying evidence to the claim that such logics are in fact true. No means 
though seem to be available to offer such an evidence (there seems to be a 
considerable underdetermination at this level). As far as we see, applied logics 
can be at most pragmatically acceptable (given certain methodological con-
siderations), but hardly true simpliciter, and thus why should we be committed 
to this notion? We shall then propose an agnostic view with regard to truth. 
After all, from certain aspects, we don't need this notion in order to under-
stand, develop and apply logic; indeed, in order to do most ofthe usual things 
we intend to with it! (This point though is quite controversial, and shall be 
developed in future papers.) , . ,. ,, , 
All these general remarks concerning logic apply of course, specifically, 
to paraconsistency. In particular, as we shall now examine, we have here a 
quite comprehensive agnosticism: not only to truth, but to true contradictions 
as well. 
3 . TRUE CONTRADICTIONS? f j í í 
Based on the previous considerations, we wish to furnish in this section 
some remarks on the nature of the paraconsistent undertaking as it has been 
articulated (at least from our perspective) thus far. From our point of view, 
paraconsistent logic can be presented as a formal construction, similar in sev-
eral respects to many others found within mathematics. Just as an algebraist 
{qua algebraist) examines, for instance, properties of finite groups, indepen-
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dent from any specifíc philosophical commitments regarding them, it is pos-
sible to investígate, as it has been done, some features of Russell's set (or of 
any other «inconsistent object»), with no triviality, employing in order to do 
so a paraconsistent set theory, independent from philosophical commitments 
with regard to the nature ofthe contradictions involved (see, for instance, da 
Costa and Bueno [1996], and da Costa, Béziau and Bueno [1996]), From this 
point of view, as a research domain, paraconsistency has a conceptual status 
similar to other mathematical fíelds, 
Is this, however, an undisputed thesis, or even a simple one to defend? 
After all, when one replaces deeply entrenched components from the classical 
paradigm - within which consistency has played and still plays a prominent 
role, bounding the extensión of what could be legitimately investigated -, mov-
ing and stretching its limits, from the inconsistent to the non-trivial, wouldn't, 
to some extent, the very meaning of the researches developed ipso facto be 
changed? Remarkable debates concerning for instance the notion of existence 
in mathematics and its relationship with the concept of consistency would 
undoubtedly lose much of their strength, and probably would have to be com-
pletely rewritten, Traditional epistemológica! questíons related to the nature 
of knowledge, in particular of that supplied by mathematics, will have to be 
reviewed, Indeed, what is paraconsistent knowledge? What does it mean to 
«apprehend» an «inconsistent» object? Is such an ontology (based on this kind 
of objects) necessarily presupposed in the formulation, or in the employment, 
of a paraconsistent logic? 
These are just a few questíons, among several others that might have been 
formulated, placed at an entirely distinct level from that in which we fínd 
ourselves when making the comparison between the conceptual status of 
paraconsistency with other domains of mathematics, One is here concerned 
with a methodological distinction, Just as it is usual to opérate a demarcation 
between foundations and philosophy of mathematics, the former being, to some 
extent, entangled in mathematics, mutatis mutandis, it is possible to introduce, 
in this context, a similar distinction between foundations and philosophy of 
paraconsistency, It is clear that each ofthe above questíons involves conspicu-
ous philosophical components that are not to be found in the research devel-
oped at the foundations level, It is one thing to opérate with a paraconsistent 
logic, examine distinct formulations of it, extend its result to new domains (for 
instance, elaborating a paraconsistent model theory); another one, of a com-
pletely distinct nature, consists in investigating the nature ofthe assumptions 
involved in such an inquiry. As far as we understand, it is perfectly legitímate 
to develop the fírst activities in an almost independent way from the second 
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ones, Indeed, it is for this very reason that we have matched the status of 
paraconsistency with that of mathematics. 
Such a demarcation, between foundations and philosophy of paracon-
sistency, represents of course just a «división of labor» within the various 
researches in this área, by no means indicating any kind of negative evaluation 
with regard to the parts involved. This is, nevertheless, an important delimita-
tion, whose neglect may add up to severe distortions, despite being quite simple, 
For instance, G, Priest and R, Routley, based on the presentation of a certain 
kind of paraconsistent logic, seem to argüe for the existence of «true contra-
dictions» (a proposal that they cali «dialethism»; see Priest and Routley [ 1989], 
and Priest [1987]), Independent from the acceptance or not ofthe existence of 
such contradictions, it seems to us that the very strategy of argumentation 
adopted by them is considerably fragüe, Just as, in general, one does not settle 
metaphysical issues, ñor choose between rival conceptions of this kind, by 
appealing to current physics (given that the latter, in most cases, underdeter-
mines the former), one does not establish questíons concerning the interpreta-
tion and nature of logic based on the sheer examination ofthe content ofthe 
logical theories involved (indeed, factors of several orders have to be taken 
into account in such a context), From our point of view, it seems that the sheer 
formulation of a logic does not in general supply the very defense of a «specu-
lative» thesis regarding it: the fact that there are paraconsistent logics does not 
necessarily commit one to the existence of «true contradictions», These are 
traits clearly situated at distinct levéis. 
For this reason, as opposed to Restall (see Restall [1995]), in our opinión, 
there is no problem with the adoption of an agnosticism with regard to the 
existence of this kind of contradiction. According to Restall, «this does not 
seem to be an interesting position to hold. After all, each theorist in this par-
ticular debate thinks that if paraconsistency is true, then either dialethic or 
non-dialethicparaconsistency is true too» ([1995], p. 2, note 1; the italics are 
ours). On the contrary, it seems to us that even the antecedent of this condi-
tional is fairly tendentious. The question concerning the truth of paraconsistency 
will inevitably carry us beyond the limits of paraconsistent logic, at least as far 
as its foundations are concerned - the level in which we intend to be. Thus, if 
from Restall's viewpoint, «it is unclear whether Brazilian school of 
paraconsistency adheres to a non-dialethic or a dialethic paraconsistency, as 
their writings do not indícate whether they think of inconsistencies as possibiy 
true or not» ([1995], p, 3), this is just a sign ofthe agnostic view that we hold. 
A commitment to the truth of paraconsistency, as we have already remarked. 
by no means seems to be, from our perspective, necessary neither for the de-
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velopment of theoretical research with regard to paraconsistent logic ñor for 
the various applications that such research has opened up, In connection with 
the former, heuristic and pragmatic commitments (independent from the no-
tion of truth) are enough to motívate and sustain the most diverse inquiries in 
the fíeld; concerning the latter, a commitment to the «pragmatic truth» (or to 
the sheer «empirical adequacy») of such a logic seems to suffice to «legití-
mate» its applications. Henee, one finds here a double-headed agnosticism: on 
the one hand, with regard to the truth of paraconsistency; on the other, though 
closely linked to this, concerning the existence of true contradictions, 
However, although this seems to be, to some extent, a quite simple thesis, 
at the abstract level of formal sciences, just as the research related to 
paraconsistent set theory suggests (this is, for instance, the case of Russell's 
set and Russell's relations), there is, in a certain sense, the possibility ofthe 
«existence» of «true» contradictions, Nonetheless, such notions, both of exist-
ence and of reality, have in this context of course quite distinct a meaning (and 
independent from the postulation of any Platonic world!) from the one em-
ployed when one claims that reality is actually contradictory - not jeopardiz-
ing thus, in any way, our agnosticism. 
Anyway, independent of «speculative» issues such as these, and once again 
in conformity to the agnosticism here proposed, perhaps one ofthe most strik-
ing features supplied by paraconsistency consists in its considerable «heuristic 
power»: new conceptual perspectives are brought, leading thus to new ques-
tíons and new problems to be examined, To illustrate this remark, we can 
mention (among others) two examples, one of them from logic, the other from 
mathematics, which have been developed in detall elsewhere (see da Costa, 
Béziau and Bueno [1996], Chapter 3, and Mortensen [1990]). 
(1) Based on the development of a paraconsistent set theory, it is possible 
to advance a paraconsistent model theory, which generalizes several classical 
results. Moreover, (2) still based on such a development, the devising of a 
paraconsistent theory ofinfinitesimals, which reformulates, under new grounds, 
one ofthe most celebrated (though no less controversial) concepts of math-
ematical analysis is made possible, In particular, in this theory of infínitesimals, 
the well known inconsistencies detected in the foundations of the calculus, 
since its very inception, can be taken at face valué. Consider, for instance, the 
following remarks made, in 1696, by the Marquis de l'Hospital, a pupil of 
Leibniz and John Bemoulli, in the beginníng of his Analyse des Infiniment 
Petitspour ITntelligence des Lignes Courbes; 
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First requirement or supposition, One requíres that one may substitute 
for one another two quantities which differ only by an infinitely small 
quantity: or (which is the samê  that a quantity which is increased or 
decreased only by a quantity wnich is infinitely smaller than itself may 
be considered to have remained the same [„,], (de l'Hospital [1696J; 
quoted in Robinson [1967]; the italics are ours,) 
AS the italicized expressíon makes plain, de l'Hospital's fírst requirement 
is clearly inconsistent! However, at least from de l'Hospital's viewpoint, his 
proposals were not trivial, It seems fairly natural then to suggest a paraconsistent 
approach to reconstruct his views, 
' So, as these two brief examples suggest, paraconsistency may supply in-
teresting perspectives to the examination of conceptual issues involving in-
consistencies, though, as we have been arguing for, in an independent way 
from any specifíc philosophical commitments with regard both to truth and to 
true contradictions, 
4 . CONCLUDING REMARKS ., 
We wish to conclude this paper concisely gathering together some of its 
threads, After examining some components of a framework consisting of some 
general remarks on logic (in which two inadequate views of it were critically 
investigated), we have presented some arguments to the effect that a fallibilist, 
pluralist, though certaínly not relativist, proposal might be interestingly pur-
sued, Based on this proposal, we have argued for a comprehensive agnosti-
cism in connection to some issues raised by paraconsistency, 
We should note that such an agnosticism, not being phiiosophically com-
mitted to any particular «interpretative» claims surroundíng paraconsistency, 
seems to be more adequate than the alternative proposals, In particular, for 
that matter, it may reflect a more appropriate attitude for the researcher in the 
paraconsistency domain, who may simply «put into brackets» his/her possible 
commitments with regard to them, while investigating the relevant issues, 
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